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Euroscepticism – the range of critical arguments and sentiments against
the economic and political project of the European Union – is on
the rise across the 27 member states. As next year’s European Parliament elections are nearing, there is an
increasing interest in the possible impact this will have on the makeup of the Parliament. But before we start such
speculation it is worth asking whether we can treat Euroscepticism as a unitary concept? Is it a shared common
denominator that allows parties across Europe to collaborate on a shared agenda? We argue that at least the
Nordic version of Euroscepticism gives little indication of this being the case.
On many a scale the True Finns party would rate among the most successful Eurosceptic political parties in Europe.
During the 2011 parliamentary elections True Finns captured just over 19% of the vote, becoming the third largest
party in the Finnish parliament. Having campaigned on a largely Eurosceptic ticket, True Finns and its leader Timo
Soini became the shining stars behind the rising fortunes of the European far-right. In fact it was just earlier this year
that Mr Soini visited the LSE to share his thoughts on the EU and the Euro with an attentive audience. Only weeks
before his visit Mr Soini had expressed his hope that Finland could join the UK in organising a referendum on EU
membership and to renegotiate its relationship with the EU.
It is tempting to draw parallels between the recent successes of UKIP and the True Finns. The performance of UKIP
candidates in the 2013 local council elections was the strongest of any political party outside the top three of Labour,
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats since the Second World War and a strong indication that Euroscepticism is
again on the rise in the UK. At the very least, the Eurosceptic argument is returning to the political limelight in Britain
and there is much speculation around the possible performance of UKIP in the next national elections. It remains to
be seen whether they will be able to follow in the slipstream of the likes of True Finns.
Is the Euro crisis generating a pan-European movement of Euroscepticism? Yes and no. While Euroscepticism is on
the rise, it is important to note that this consists of a diverse movement where the differences between Eurosceptic
parties are sometimes more prominent than the similarities. In 2001 Taggart and Szcerbiak differentiated between
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism in order to distinguish between the hard-liners who argued for severing the ties
between their home nation and the EU and the softer variations that urged a renegotiation of the European treaties
in order to return a greater degree of sovereignty back to member states. Within this framework, UKIP and True
Finns fall clearly on different sides of the argument, with UKIP advocating a hard-line withdrawal from Europe while
the True Finns are calling for a review of the relationship between Finland and the EU that falls clearly short of
withdrawal.
1/2
This is not to say that hard Euroscepticism does not exist in the
Nordic countries but it has become rarer. In Sweden,
Euroscepticism is a question that involves almost all parties
across the political spectrum. Examples include the Left Party
that takes a hard Eurosceptic stance and has called for Sweden
to leave the EU as soon as possible. In the last few years the
party has softened its opposition and now wants to change the
EU from the inside. The Juni-list is a single-issue party
advocating soft Euroscepticism, a strategy which enabled them
to capture a whopping 14.5% of the mainstream electoral vote
for EU parliamentary elections in 2004 (although it was never
able to come even close to repeating this one-off electoral
success). Most of the other mainstream parties each have their own hard and soft Eurosceptic factions as well. The
consequence of such a crowded political space in the market for Euroscepticism has meant that far-right parties –
UKIP’s likely allies in the European political scene – tend to focus more on national debates around issues such as
immigration rather than on Brussels.
Swedish Democrats, the more mainstream representatives of the far-right, do not publicly go as far as to demand an
exit from the EU, but rather articulate a vision for another kind of European co-operation. This vision sees Europe as
a nationalist project rather than a neo-liberal and multicultural one where the interests of the blue collar ‘common
man’ and an ethnically homogenous Sweden should be protected. This is where the approaches of the Finnish and
Swedish far-right coalesce, for their critical approach to the European project is premised on protecting and
strengthening a social democratic nation state. One could call this ‘welfare nationalism’. In contrast to UKIPs neo-
liberal market-driven, anti state rhetoric, the far-right in Finland and Sweden aspire to a welfare nation state where
the extensive and generous social policies are offered preferentially to ethnic Swedes and Finns. For them, the
Nordic state should take care of its own and protect itself from excessive exposure to global markets, multi-
culturalism and an EU superstate.
So whilst there is growing Eurosceptic sentiment across Europe and more and more political parties are rising to
prominence with the help of Eurosceptic labels, it is also important to ask how much these parties really have in
common. What exactly do we find under this catch-all label? Is their anti-EU stance really sufficient grounds for
talking about a pan-European political movement? If the comparison of UKIP and the Nordic experience is anything
to go by, this is still some way from becoming a reality.
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